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A B S T R A C T   
Impact of national food fortification programs is contingent on the extent to which there is compliance with 
national standards. However, this compliance is often sub-optimal and is not consistently measured. One of the 
challenges to more regular measurement is an over-reliance on quantitative assessments of micronutrient levels 
for compliance, which are costly. In resource constrained environments, this contributes to weaknesses in reg-
ulatory monitoring. We offer an alternative, systems-based approach to determine compliance, presenting a 
unique score that can capture firms’ compliance behaviour, based on whether and how firms actually carry out 
stages of the fortification process. The key utility of such a measure being its use to monitor fortification pro-
pensity and assess changes in response to interventions. Further, we present an empirical application of this 
measure, providing novel evidence on firms’ compliance towards food fortification regulations in Bangladesh, 
investigating the institutional and firm-level factors that correlate with compliance behaviour towards food 
fortification regulations among edible oil and salt producers.   
1. Introduction 
Large-scale fortification of staple foods and condiments is a cost- 
effective, scalable and evidence-based strategy to help meet human re-
quirements for essential nutrients and address micronutrient de-
ficiencies, when delivered as intended (Horton, 2006; Keats et al., 
2019). An important factor determining the impact of national food 
fortification programs is the extent to which there is compliance with 
national standards. However, this compliance is often sub-optimal, 
limiting potential for impact; and is often not consistently measured, 
also limiting the ability of program managers to implement course 
corrective actions. One reason for this is an over-reliance on quantitative 
tests of nutrients as the definitive indicator of compliance because they 
offer numerical results that can be compared (directly or indirectly) with 
the micronutrient specifications. Specifically, verifying legal compliance 
involves product sampling across different batches at the production site 
to produce composite samples that are tested for nutrient content in 
accredited laboratories (Rimkus, 2021). While important, over-reliance 
on such an approach is prohibitive in terms of costs and availability of 
resources, with resulting weaknesses in regulatory and performance 
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monitoring (Luthringer et al., 2015; Rowe et al., 2018).1 
Current policy guidance (GAIN and PHC, 2018) recommends a 
different paradigm, in the form of a systems-based approach to deter-
mine compliance, emphasizing the process of fortification over regular 
testing of fortified food samples; including specific components, such as 
a comprehensive audit checklist that covers food quality, food safety and 
use of the premix to determine whether the fortification process is suf-
ficiently adding micronutrients to foods. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, there is no existing methodology to operationalize this 
recommendation or devise an alternative indicator of compliance. 
To address this gap in the literature, we present a new methodo-
logical approach that can capture firms’ compliance behaviour to food 
fortification, based on whether and how firms actually carry out the 
stages of any fortification process. We draw from Henson and Heasman 
(1998), and frame firm-level decision to comply with regulations for 
food items as a multi-stage process, where in the first stage, the firm 
engages with the regulation, and, in the second stage, the firm decides 
whether to fortify food items, based on perceived costs and profits of 
compliance and on incentives and penalties, and, if so, how. In capturing 
compliance behaviour, we specifically focus on the steps following a 
firm’s decision to comply which constitute the different stages of a 
standard compliance process, the implementation and monitoring 
related to the fortification, targeting the technologies and processes 
adopted by the firm. The score itself comprises general components for 
fortification related with the premix; storage; different equipment, its 
use, maintenance and calibration; and internal monitoring. Further 
components can be added to these general ones, depending on the 
product and specific nature of the fortificant. 
The utility of such a measure is threefold. First, it can be used by 
fortification program stakeholders to monitor fortification and assess 
changes in response to interventions such as capacity building. Second, 
it can provide a proxy for assessing compliance, providing a less costly, 
human resource and technical capacity intensive alternative to 
compliance measurement. Third, it can serve an explanatory purpose by 
assessing the components of compliance related behaviours that predict 
compliance or non-compliance in a given context and hence inform 
targeted corrective actions. 
Furthermore, building on such a compliance measure, a sustainable 
longer-term compliance method could combine frequent monitoring of 
the compliance behaviour score with occasional quantitative product 
testing. For product sampling, products have to be analysed in 
accredited labs, following strict protocols. With further testing and 
validation, our approach can reduce the frequency of such sampling/ 
testing such that the legally enforceable inspections occur with lower 
frequency. We would argue that this would be a positive, so that the 
inspections can be more preventive and cooperative than punitive and 
enforcement focused. Such a protocol would be relatively more cost- 
effective,2 and would also be likely to yield greater and more accurate 
data on compliance from firms. Testing this combination is however 
outside the scope of this study but remains a future direction for further 
research. 
Although many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) have 
adopted food fortification as a vehicle to improve nutrition, firms’ level 
of compliance with fortification standards varies greatly across country 
contexts (Aaron et al., 2017; Luthringer et al., 2015). We apply our 
methodology to oil and salt fortification in Bangladesh, where fortifi-
cation of salt with iodine and edible oil with Vitamin A has been 
mandatory since 1989 and 2013, respectively (Aaron et al., 2017; 
Fig. 1. Compliance process for firms. 
Source: Adapted from Henson and Heasman (1998). 
1 For example, a recent assessment of regulatory monitoring across different 
country programs revealed costs and capacity for laboratory testing to be 
prohibitive, with 38% of respondents reporting a lack of equipment and inputs 
for laboratories, and 50% indicating a lack of trained staff and technical ca-
pacity (Luthringer et al., 2015). Further, our own assessment from production 
monitoring data across 20 example sites (data available on request from au-
thors) suggests that the process only including an audit would incur an indic-
ative cost of USD 18,500, but when product sampling (5 samples from 2 batches 
per industry) and analysis for nutrient content (across a range of typical foods 
and nutrients) are included, additional costs of USD 18,000 are incurred. 2 We provide a comparison of costs in Section 6. 
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Knowles et al., 2017). However, in 2015, only 65% of households had 
salt with some added iodine, whereas 51% had salt that was adequately 
iodized (Knowles et al., 2017). Similarly, a market assessment con-
ducted in 2017 revealed that 59% of oil available in Bangladesh is for-
tified, (Jungjohann et al., 2019; Jungjohann et al., 2021). Further, there 
is a stark difference between packaged and bulk oil in terms of fortifi-
cation status: while 95% of packaged oil was found to be appropriately 
fortified, only 41% of bulk oil met the standard (GAIN and icddr’b, 
2017). These findings indicate suboptimal compliance and a missed 
opportunity to tackle high prevalence of micronutrient deficiency in 
Bangladesh: 20.6% and 40.0% of children of school age were Vitamin A 
and iodine deficient, respectively, according to the Bangladesh Micro-
nutrient Survey of 2011–2012. 
Our study makes a twofold contribution. First, we provide a general 
methodological innovation to accurately measure compliance with 
processes needed to meet food fortification standards without the need 
for costly micronutrient quantification; Second, we present novel evi-
dence applying this method for Bangladesh, and draw attention to key 
institutional and firm-level factors for firms’ compliance towards food 
fortification regulations among edible oil and salt producers. The paper 
is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature 
on fortification and motivates the framework; Section 3 outlines the 
conceptual basis for the new compliance score; Section 4 provides de-
tails of the research methodology, including the survey design, variables 
and key hypotheses; Section 5 presents the results including the 
descriptive statistics on key variables and analysis of the factors that 
correlate with firms’ compliance behaviour; Section 6 discusses the re-
sults in terms of the wider context of the study and key policy implica-
tions; and Section 7 provides concluding remarks. 
2. Food fortification – Framework 
Food fortification law is an example of regulation that aims to 
improve public goods – in this case the nutritional outcomes of the 
population. Existing research highlights the necessary conditions for 
private firms– whose main objective is to generate profit – to comply 
with regulations aimed at increasing public goods and specifically 
nutritious food items. These include effective enforcement of regula-
tions, the existence as well as adequate distribution of economic benefits 
gained from complying with regulations, and the technical capacity to 
comply (Henson and Heasman, 1998; Maestre et al., 2017). In addition, 
effective enforcement of regulations creates incentives for firms to 
comply as failing to do so can lead to significant economic loss for 
violating firms because of penalties and recalls, alongside disclosure of 
food scandals, which results in negative publicity and loss of consumer 
trust (Henson and Hooker, 2001; Hollweg, 2019). Evidence indicates 
that there are two levels of factors influencing firms’ compliance with 
fortification laws: firm-level factors and institutional factors. Below, we 
elaborate on these two levels of factors that incentivise for-profit firms to 
comply with fortification regulations. 
2.1. Firm-level factors 
Henson and Heasman (1998) suggest that firm-level decision to 
comply with regulations for food items is a multi-stage process (Fig. 1). 
The first stage for the firm is engagement with the regulation - iden-
tifying the regulation, understanding the details, and identifying what 
changes need to be made to the current operation practices. Then, the 
firm decides whether or not to comply, and if so how. Subsequently, the 
proposed changes in operation need to be communicated internally and 
the compliance decision is taken. Then, the implementation is done and 
finally monitored (implementation of compliance and quality control). 
Motives, attitude and capability of the firm have been demonstrated to 
be important influences on the likelihood of compliance or non- 
compliance (Kagan and Scholz, 1980). 
Small- and medium-scale producers may be disadvantaged in 
acquiring information about and engaging with regulations (i.e. the first 
three steps in the above process) (Yapp and Fairman, 2006). This is 
because small-scale firms may lack staff capacity to constantly monitor 
changes in the regulatory environment (Henson and Heasman, 1998; 
Yapp and Fairman, 2006). Additionally, firms may struggle to identify 
relevant sources of information regarding regulation when the roles and 
responsibilities of regulation development and enforcement may not be 
well communicated (Luthringer et al., 2015).3 Drawing on this, the key 
hypothesis of the paper examines the relationship between engagement, 
as outlined in the framework above, with food fortification and firm 
compliance behaviour. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Firms’ engagement with food fortification, which 
includes knowledge around the issues surrounding fortification and its 
regulation, as well as the health implications and current consumption 
levels of fortified food are important factors explaining firms’ 
compliance. 
Once firms gather needed information about the regulations, in the 
second stage they decide whether to fortify food items, and, if so, how. 
Firms make decisions based on the perceived costs and profits of 
compliance (Henson and Heasman, 1998). In terms of the cost of forti-
fication, high cost of premix has been identified as a key constraint 
(Luthringer et al., 2015). This issue is particularly challenging in LMICs, 
as premix is sold by multi-national corporations (Food Fortification 
Initiative, 2019) and has to be imported to these countries (Garrett et al., 
2016), firms – and in particular small-scale ones (Nyumuah et al., 2012) 
– face challenges in acquiring premix at a low price (SPRING, 2018). 
This may incentivise using sub-standard, and therefore cheaper, premix 
and/or applying less than the recommended quantity. 
In markets where a fortification law has only recently been intro-
duced, producers of fortified products often face competition from non- 
fortified counterparts (Abdoulaye and Manus, 2018; Luthringer et al., 
2015). In these new markets for fortified food items, awareness among 
consumers regarding the benefits of micronutrients may be low (Ara 
et al., 2010) and labelling of fortified products is unclear (Whiting and 
Calvo, 2006). As a result, producers may find that there is insufficient 
market demand for fortified products, and therefore are not incentivised 
to comply with the fortification law. In addition, profit margin is thin 
because many actors exist in a market (USAID and GAIN, 2015). As a 
result, firms are disincentivised to invest in premix and equipment 
needed for fortification. 
The literature on fortification patterns in LMICs suggests that firms 
struggle to comply with standards even when they decide to fortify 
(Osendarp et al., 2018; Maestre and Poole, 2018). For example, based on 
a study of salt iodization in Pakistan, Masuood and Janjua (2013) found 
that salt mills lacked processing equipment that ensured uniform mixing 
of iodine in salt. In Nigeria, firms faced difficulty in accessing 
high-quality, and therefore expensive, premix and adequate technology 
to mix fortificant in food items (Ogunmoyela et al., 2013). Likewise, a 
study on wheat millers in Pakistan found that, although millers own 
fortification equipment, it was of sub-optimal quality and at times was 
installed incorrectly (Randall and Anjum, 2014).4 Oil refineries, on the 
other hand, did not add fortificants consistently, leading to varying 
3 For instance in Bangladesh, the salt iodisation law remains unclear 
regarding enforcement of the law and the consequences of non-compliance 
(WHO, 2011). As a result, salt mills in Bangladesh are unable to measure the 
risk of non-compliance effectively. 
4 Another study of flour fortification in Pakistan found that fortification in-
terventions attempted to leverage public–private partnerships in a segment of 
the wheat flour value chain beset with regulatory weakness, suggesting that 
technical interventions should support rather than ignore a broader agenda of 
reforms in food policy (Ansari et al., 2018), also aligning with more recent 
findings highlighting realism about the contribution of major businesses to 
public nutrition objectives (Poole et al., 2020). 
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levels of fortification (Randall and Anjum, 2014). In addition, storage 
condition are sometimes inappropriate, which could lead to deteriora-
tion of fortificant before reaching consumers (Darnton-Hill, 1998). 
2.2. Institutional factors 
The second set of factors influencing firms’ compliance with fortifi-
cation laws is regulatory institutions and their influence on firm 
behaviour (Fig. 1). Regulation enforcement shapes firm behaviour by 
setting rules and instituting mechanisms (i.e. incentives and penalties) 
to ensure that they comply with these rules (Graham and Woods, 2006; 
Rowe et al., 2018). Indeed, inspection positively influences firms’ 
compliance with regulations that enhance public goods (Gupta et al., 
2019). However, many government agencies face challenges in effec-
tively enforcing rules. One key factor is a lack of human and financial 
resources, which hampers the frequency of inspection (Garrett and 
Luthringer, 2015). Shortage of staff means that regulatory authorities 
may find it difficult to monitor often very numerous small-scale firms 
across a country (Chadare et al., 2019). In addition, a high turnover of 
staff implies that the skills and know-how of fortification monitoring are 
quickly lost (WHO, 2006). This results in infrequent and ineffective 
visits at production sites by regulators. Therefore, a second hypothesis of 
this study examines how frequency of inspections from the regulatory 
authority influences firms’ compliance. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Frequency of inspections by the regulatory au-
thority is linked positively with firms’ compliance. 
Even when regulators detect under-compliance or non-compliance, 
there may be a lack of consequences to this behaviour, such as when 
fines imposed on producers are too low (Luthringer et al., 2015). 
Sometimes, regulators keep fines low due to concerns about the political 
cost of harsh regulation (Luthringer et al., 2015). This undermines 
compliance (Iscenko et al., 2016) as firms choose to pay the fine instead 
of upgrading their fortification equipment in order to avoid fines. 
Combined with infrequent inspections by regulators, firms do not 
perceive inspections as threatening. The third hypothesis of the paper 
interrogates the relationship between firms’ perceived effectiveness5 of 
incentives and penalties and compliance behaviour. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Firm’s perceived effectiveness of the penalties and 
incentives set by the government is linked positively with compliance. 
Weak enforcement can be made more effective if regulators disclose 
firms’ non-compliance, leading to negative publicity and therefore a 
damaged reputation among consumers (Hollweg, 2019; Loader and 
Hobbs, 1999).6 However, for such pressure from consumers to materi-
alise, the public must be aware of the fortification law in the first place, 
as well as the benefits of fortification. As this is often not the case (Ara 
et al., 2010), firms’ engagement with regulations, which includes 
knowledge around the issues surrounding fortification and its regulation 
as well as the health implications and current consumption levels of 
fortified food also remains low, which undermines their willingness to 
comply with the fortification law. In relation to this, we study the role of 
engagement for firms in mediating distrust of incentives and penalties. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Firms’ food fortification engagement mediates 
distrust of incentives and penalties. 
Overall, these dynamics crucially influence firm’s perception of costs 
and benefits of compliance (Henson and Heasman, 1998), and thereby 
their decision to comply. 
3. Measuring compliance behaviour 
In the context of food fortification, compliance is broadly defined as 
conformity to the micronutrient specifications detailed in the nationally 
adopted standards and to other food quality, safety, packaging, and 
labelling requirements (GAIN and PHC, 2018). These standards are often 
published as targets or actionable limits in the regulation or law, and the 
rules for enforcement are articulated. Additionally, the nodal agency for 
regulatory enforcement and monitoring is empowered to administer 
fines and penalties for non-compliance. In order to be deemed 
compliant, all food production facilities within the scope of the fortifi-
cation regulations must ensure that their products conform to the 
micronutrient specifications detailed in the nationally adopted stan-
dards and to other food quality, safety, packaging, and labelling re-
quirements. Determining whether a food manufacturing facility and its 
products are compliant is based upon the monitoring activities con-
ducted by regulatory authorities. Before the actionable limits are pub-
lished, government regulators need to agree upon and document the 
actions that will take place when quantitative results indicate that 
samples collected by inspectors from food production sites fall outside of 
the actionable limits. However, quantitative tests based on samples are 
often prohibitive, leading to severe weaknesses in regulatory monitoring 
(Luthringer et al., 2015; Rowe et al., 2018). 
A major challenge is measuring compliance behaviour that deviates 
Fig. 2. Compliance Behaviour Score Methodology.  
5 Firm’s perceived effectiveness of incentives and penalties will be captured 
by responses provided through a survey. The survey was targeted to firm 
managers and owners or a firm representative with sufficient knowledge of the 
fortification processes. 
6 Bangladesh has experience of such incidents, for instance in the oil industry 
(New Age, 2016). 
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from the regulation norms (i.e. non-compliance), as firms might be 
reluctant to self-report such behaviour. Firms are expected to report 
high compliance levels when asked about formal regulations or the 
implementation of these (IDS et al., 2020). In order to overcome this 
hurdle, we present a unique ‘Compliance Behaviour Score’ (CBS) that 
measures whether and how firms actually carry out stages of the forti-
fication process in accordance with the framework outlined by Henson 
and Heasman (1998). Fig. 2 illustrates the compliance behaviour score 
methodology building on the stage of ‘implementation of compliance 
and quality control’: first, it outlines the three specific concepts 
(Concept Addressed) that are covered – implementation, monitoring and 
awareness; second, the target measurement that corresponds to each 
(Target Measured): technology for implementation, processes for 
monitoring, and human resources for awareness; finally, it presents the 
levels (Levels of Assessment) across the targets that may include use, 
access, source, quality and regulations’ internalisation. 
We create two different versions of the score. CBS 1 is the main score 
that captures the different stages of a standard compliance process 
following a firm’s decision to comply. It captures the implementation 
and monitoring related to the fortification, targeting the technologies 
and processes adopted by the firm. The score comprises the following 
common components for fortificants (the full list included in this 
research is described in Appendix A): 1. Storage facility for premix; 2. 
Premix measurement equipment; 3. Mixers; 4. Fortification related IT 
use; 5. Testing samples (a. Single ‘grab sample’; b. Composite sample); 6. 
Recording of premix, mixing, final products, etc. (a. Premix stocktake; b. 
Premix calculations; c. Equipment maintenance; d. Equipment calibra-
tion; e. Mixing procedure; f. Frequency of sampling; g. Point of sampling; 
h. Test methods validation; i. Corrective actions). 
For this research, applying the general methodology to edible oil and 
salt, the score for oil firms includes: 1. Titration equipment; 2. Blenders; 
while the score for salt firms includes: 1. Spraying technology; 2. Salt 
test kits; and 3. Salt iodization plants. Each of these technologies and 
processes is assessed at four levels: its use, access, source, and quality; 
giving us a comprehensive picture of the firm’s likely behaviour towards 
compliance. Combining the data from the various technologies and 
processes gave us the score for each firm. In our framework, the degree 
of compliance with mandatory fortification is captured by this compli-
ance score. 
We also create CBS 2, an alternate score that helps assess the 
robustness of the measurement. We consider this alternative definition 
that incorporates awareness of fortification regulations, targeting the 
firm’s human resources. This is assessed by how much the knowledge of 
the regulations is spread within the firm. Throughout the paper we will 
use CBS 1 as the main variable of interest, whereas CBS 2 will be 
employed to test the robustness of our baseline results. 
Constructing a score that captures firm behaviour in relation to 
compliance is new in the literature on compliance with food fortification 
regulations. Given the novelty of the methodology, we perform various 
checks to examine the validity of this measure and its different defini-
tions in our model. Through the above methodology we aim to provide a 
flexible framework that can be applied to different institutional contexts 
and industries. However, while we can assess the internal validity of this 
measure, examining its full external validity is a direction for future 
research, including further validation against measured micronutrient 
content to ascertain the full range of applications. 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1. Quantitative data 
4.1.1. Survey 
A survey of edible oil and salt producers in Bangladesh was con-
ducted from August to September 2019. This firm-level survey was 
designed to capture the main correlates of compliance (and non- 
compliance) with food fortification regulations, considering the speci-
ficities of these two industries in the Bangladeshi context. 
The sampling frame consisted of 223 salt producers and about 80 oil 
producers (oil refineries and packers) in Bangladesh (IDS et al., 2020). 
The population of oil firms can be categorised into refineries (32%), 
registered packers (48%), and unregistered packers (20%). The target 
sample size for the survey was determined based on the following 
criteria: power calculations for drawing a statistically relevant number 
of firms that are representative of the edible oil and salt producers in 
Bangladesh; and expected response rates of firms and budget 
considerations.7 
We began by conducting a pilot survey with 4 firms to understand the 
Bangladeshi context and inform the survey design based on findings 
from this exercise. Then, we targeted a random sample of 200 firms 
(68% of the total population), 150 salt firms and 50 oil firms (refineries8 
and registered packers),9 drawn from the lists of firms prepared by the 
survey team as described earlier. Out of this sample, our data collection 
team completed a total 137 interviews with oil and salt firms (Table 1 
below): 102 interviews with salt firms and 35 interviews with oil firms – 
approximately 70% of the total target population.10 
A key component of the survey was designed to measure food 
fortification engagement among firms, an element that stands out as 
crucial in the following analyses. Aside from standard characteristics – 
the type and level of production, human capital, and main reference 
markets – the survey was structured to gauge the most prominent factors 
associated with firms’ behaviour from the firm and institutional 
perspective. Firm-level factors include the characteristics of the premix 
supply, quality assurance standards, and human resources involved in 
the fortification process. Institutional features include the quality and 
characteristics of the normative environment (the frequency of in-
spections by the regulatory authority, sources of information on forti-
fication requirements, the effectiveness of the incentives and penalties 
set by the government), but also the presence of external support. 
The geographical distribution of the sampled firms across various 
districts of Bangladesh (Fig. A1 in Appendix B) reveals that the salt firms 
are concentrated in Chittagong/Chattogram, Narayangonj, and Cox’s 
Bazar, while the oil firms are spread across different districts, but are 
mainly located in Narayangonj and Cumilla. 
4.1.2. Variables 
A complete list of variables constructed and used for our analysis is 
outlined in Table 2 and discussed in detail below. We begin by outlining 
Table 1 
. Sample size – oil and salt.  
Group Total Oil Salt 
Sample size 
(Achieved) 
137 35 102 
Target sample 
(% of population) 
68% 70% 67% 
Response rate 
(% of target) 
70% 70% 68%  
7 We cover the geographical distribution of the firms, but do not target rep-
resentation by geography.  
8 The unit of analysis in this study is the refinery because production data is 
for the refinery rather than the enterprise group. However, we assume a single 
refinery is representative of its enterprise group (in terms of firm behaviour).  
9 The starting point to determine appropriate sample sizes is the definition of 
at least one key indicator on which to base the sample size calculations. We can, 
and often do, bypass this requirement by setting up a proxy indicator, and 
estimating the size requirement using a worst case scenario. The margin of error 
(or sampling error) that represents the range in which the true value of the 
population is expected to lie is also set. We set a 95% confidence level.  
10 60–70% target response rates are typical of firm-level surveys. 
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the dependent variables and the main variables of interest. 
4.1.2.1. Dependent variables. Compliance Behaviour Score 1 (CBS 1): 
Compliance is identified using the tool designed to capture firm 
behaviour to comply with food fortification regulations in the 
Bangladesh context. For each technology/process relevant for fortifi-
cation (as discussed in Section 3), we asked the following four questions 
for the four different levels of assessment:  
• Use: Do you employ any of these? (1-Yes; 0-No)  
• Source: Is it an in-house process or equipment? (1-Yes; 0-No)  
• Access: Do you have access to it? (1-Yes; 0-No)  
• Quality: How well do you think it is working? (Likert Scale of 1(Very 
bad)-5 (Very well)) 
We generate dummy variables for the first three questions and a 
normalized variable in the range 0–1 for the fourth question. We take the 
average across all technologies/processes to give us an intermediate 
score for each question (Fig. A2, Appendix B). The final score is the 
average of all the intermediate scores for each firm in the interval [0,1]. 
Comply: To construct a dummy variable that identifies compliance, 
we assume that values of the score higher than the average identifies 
firms that comply effectively with the fortification regulations, whereas 
being below the average means poor norm implementation. We create a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CBS 1 is higher than the 
average for oil (0.75) and salt (0.62) respectively, or 0 otherwise. 
Compliance Behaviour Score 2 (CBS 2): As discussed in Section 3, to 
check the validity of our main score, we also construct a second 
compliance score that in addition to the first one includes information 
on the human resources involved in the fortification process or aware of 
the fortification requirements. We asked the following two questions to 
capture regulations’ internalisation in relation to compliance:  
• Does your firm have a designated compliance person / role? (1-Yes; 
0-No) 
• Who in your company needs to be aware of the mandatory fortifi-
cation requirements? 1-Compliance staff; 2. Operational and plant 
managers; 3. Production staff; 4. Sales staff 
We generate dummy variables for compliance person/role in the first 
question and dummy variables for categories of staff that are aware of 
the fortification requirements (1-Aware; 0-Not aware). We take the 
average across all categories of staff to create an intermediate score. The 
human resources score is the average of the first dummy variable and the 
intermediate score. The final score (CBS 2) is the average of CBS 1 and 
the human resources score. 
4.1.2.2. Independent variables. Next, we discuss the independent vari-
ables and the control variables. 
Engagement: Food fortification engagement was captured by a 
distinct section of the survey that was intended to assess firms’ knowl-
edge around the issues surrounding food fortification and its regulation. 
The following five questions were asked:  
• Can you remember when mandatory fortification for salt/oil was 
first introduced?  
• In your opinion, what are the main consequences of iodine/Vitamin 
A deficiency?  
• In your opinion, what percentage of households in Bangladesh 
consume fortified salt/oil?  
• What do you think is likely to happen to fortified salt/oil during 
transportation, storage, and distribution?  
• Do you know what is the name of the new body that the Ministry of 
Industries is planning to establish in order to ensure standardisation, 
regulatory monitoring, QA/QC [quality assurance/quality control] 
of all fortified food and products? 
A set of options was provided with each question, and respondents 
had to choose among them, but only one of the options was right.11 
Among oil firms, the correct responses were given by 77%, 89%, 20%, 
69%, and 6% of them, for the first, second, third, fourth and fifth 
question respectively. Across the same questions, percentage of salt 
firms that gave correct responses were 64%, 98%. 23%, 6%, and 12% 
respectively. These questions did not just test the respondents’ under-
standing of the normative environment, but also examined broader as-
pects related to the fortification policy, such as familiarity with the 
health implications of insufficient Vitamin A/iodine.12 Thus, it tries to 
assess if the firm has internalised not just the regulatory framework, but 
a broader set of implications surrounding food fortification. The number 
of correct answers forms our engagement score [Engagement], which 
Table 2 
. List of variables.  
Variable Description 
Dependent variables 
COMPLIANCE – MAIN  
Compliance Behaviour Score 
1 (CBS 1) 
Score based on the use, access, source, and quality of 
the processes and equipment for fortification. Discrete 
variable running in the interval [0,1]. 
Comply Dummy variable – value of 1 if the CBS 1 is higher than 
the average for oil and salt respectively, 0 otherwise. 
[0 or 1].   
COMPLIANCE – OTHER  
Compliance Behaviour Score 
2 (CBS 2) 
Score based on CBS 1, plus additional information on 
the human resources involved in the fortification 
process or aware of the fortification requirements. 
Discrete variable running in the interval [0,1].  
Independent variables [primary variables of interest] 
Engagement Food fortification engagement measured as the 
number of correct answers to the questions on 
engagement and awareness. Discrete variable running 
in the interval [0,5]. 
Inspections The number of inspections by government authorities 
that firms tend to receive per year. Discrete variable. 
Inspection dummy Dummy variable – value of 1 if the number of 
inspections by government authorities is higher than 
the average for oil and salt, respectively. [0 or 1]. 
Effectiveness Average perceived effectiveness of the incentives and 
penalties set by the government. Discrete variable 
running in the interval [0,5]. 
Distrust Dummy variable – value of 1 if the average perceived 
effectiveness of the incentives and penalties set by the 
government is less than 4.5 (salt sample only). [0 or 
1].   
Control variables 
Employees Number of workers employed by the firm in 2018. 
Age Number of years since the establishment started 
operations. 
AvgInst Firm’s reported average degree of importance (on a 
scale from 1-Most important to 9-Least important) 
across three out of nine institutional factors that 
require improvement to ensure compliance with 
fortification standards (i.e., clear regulations, 
regulatory agency structure, and capacity)0.1 [1,9].  
1 The full list of factors include: clear regulations; regulatory agency structure; 
regulatory agency capacity; regulatory agency financing; laboratory capacity; 
sampling/testing procedures; food industry engagement; enforcement (in-
centives/penalties); and communication between sectors. 
11 Respondents could also reply ‘I don’t know’, which was treated as a wrong 
answer to the question.  
12 Note that these five questions together capture firms’ engagement with food 
fortification – we argue that using any one of these questions, or only a sub-set, 
would create a potential mis-measurement issue. Hence, we make use of the 
composite score throughout the paper. 
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thus lies in the interval [0,5]. 
Inspections: To capture monitoring and enforcement at the firm level 
we measure the frequency of inspections by government authorities per 
year. Firms were asked about the number of inspections that they have 
per year. 
Effectiveness: The perceived effectiveness of the institutional devices 
set by the government was gauged through a different section of the 
survey concerning the incentives and penalties already in place. Firms 
were asked if they knew of any incentive/penalty enforced by the au-
thorities, their type, and the firm’s perception of the effectiveness of 
each category. This last feature was evaluated on a scale ranging from 
Not at all effective to Very effective, mapped into the interval [1,5]. An 
arbitrary value of 0 was assigned to firms that were not aware of any 
incentive/penalty set by the government. We then averaged across the 
different measures to obtain a proxy of the perceived effectiveness of the 
institutional regime [Effectiveness]. 
4.1.2.3. Control variables. To control for potential confounders that 
might be relevant in our setting, we also include a series of controls that 
are meant to capture basic firms’ characteristics and additional features 
of the institutional environment. Control variables include: a proxy for 
firm size [Employees] – number of workers employed by the firm in 
2018; the number of years since the establishment started operations 
[Age]; and the firm’s reported average degree of importance (on a scale 
from 1-Most important to 9-Least important) across three out of nine 
institutional factors that require improvement to ensure compliance 
with fortification standards (i.e., clear regulations, regulatory agency 
structure, and capacity) [AvgInst]. 
4.1.3. Empirical strategy 
Our analysis aims to understand the factors explaining compliance 
with oil and salt fortification regulations. Depending on the nature of the 
dependent variable, we employ different econometric models – logit for 
binary variables and generalised linear modelling (GLM) for fractional 
variables. We estimate the following: 
Complyi = f (β0 + β1Engagementi + β2Inspectionsi + β3Effectivenessi + xiγ)
(1)  
where Complytakes the value of 1 if the firm is complying effectively 
with fortification regulations and 0 otherwise, Engagement is a measure 
of firms’ knowledge in relation to food fortification; Inspectionsreflects a 
measure of frequency of audits; Effectiveness captures the perceived 
effectiveness of incentives and penalties and x is a vector of control 
variables that may affect compliance at the firm level. 
We adopt robustness checks to examine the structural validity of the 
analysis. First, we make use of the discrete CBS 1 itself to re-estimate the 
baseline models to examine the validity of the main results. Second, we 
test the robustness of the findings using the alternative definition of the 
score (CBS 2). In addition, to address potential concerns about the re-
sults with a small sample size for the oil firms and to support the main 
insights, we use bootstrapping13 to validate the model building process 
for the oil sample. 
Finally, we also use principal component analysis (PCA) to assess the 
robustness of CBS 1′s construction procedure. From our methodology, it 
is clear that the different levels of assessment (i.e. use, source, access and 
quality) carry equal weight within the score. To test this assumption, we 
rely on PCA by using the loadings of the first component (the one that 
explains most of the variance in the underlying variables) as weights for 
the different elements of CBS 1. We call the resulting score the Compli-
ance Index (CI) which is then normalized in the interval [0,1] and used to 
create a dummy variable for compliance when the index is higher than 
the average (to make the procedure equivalent to the one employed for 
the original CBS 1). We then rerun all our estimations using the dummy 
based on the index instead. In Table A2 in Appendix C we report the first 
eigenvector that we obtain from the PCA and the proportion of variance 
that it captures, for both the sample of oil and salt firms. 
4.2. Qualitative data 
In addition to the quantitative data, we obtained qualitative data 
based on in-depth qualitative interviews with key stakeholders between 
August and October 2019. In our qualitative inquiry, we gathered in-
sights on the challenges of fortification by oil and salt firms, patterns of 
inspection, and the regulatory environments of inspection. Participants 
were selected, using stratified purposeful sampling method (Patton, 
2002), to capture diversity of views of individuals who are considered 
‘typical’ of their roles along the value chains. The qualitative insights 
complement the quantitative analysis in contextualising our regression 
results. 
For the oil sector, we interviewed a total of 10 edible oil firms, 6 
wholesalers, 8 retailers, one representative from the packers’ associa-
tion, one premix supplier. For the salt sector, we interviewed 10 salt 
firms, 8 wholesalers, 11 retailers, and 3 representatives from salt mills 
associations. In addition, we conducted 5 and 3 focus group discussions 
(FGDs) with oil and salt consumers, respectively. These interviews 
addressed challenges of fortification, market incentives for fortification 
by the firms and the patterns of regulation enforcement along the two 
value chains. Moreover, to obtain information about the regulatory 
environment and challenges of law enforcement, we conducted further 5 
interviews with key informants (Nutrition International, Scaling Up 
Nutrition (SUN) Business Network, GAIN Bangladesh, the Ministry of 
Industries (MoInd), and Bangladesh Small and Cottage industries Cor-
poration (BSCIC)). 
5. Results 
To gain a better understanding of how differences in the main vari-
ables of interest are systematically related to fortification standards, we 
compare complying and non-complying firms. We first show the po-
tential pitfalls of using standard measures of compliance (both formal 
and reported). Next we move to characterising the differences between 
complying and non-complying firms as defined by our main score, using 
the dummy variable Comply. Then, we describe the findings from our 
empirical models exploring the factor explaining firms’ compliance with 
food fortification standards in the Bangladeshi context, ceteris paribus.14 
Given the idiosyncrasies that shape the institutional environment of salt 
and oil industries and, in particular, the different timing of when 
mandatory fortification was institutionalised, we conduct our analysis 
for each sample of firms separately. 
5.1. Descriptive analysis 
The edible oil producers in our sample produce soybean oil and palm 
oil (including super palm oil), which are the most widely consumed 
edible oils in Bangladesh, and which are considered fortifiable. Both oil 
refineries and oil packers procure Vitamin A premix themselves and 
fortify oil before packaging. This study examines refineries and packers 
as separate groups and then models their compliance behaviour as one 
group. The salt producers in our sample produce fine-grain, medium- 
grain, and non-refined salt as main products – covering edible and in-
dustrial salt, as the distinction between these two remains unclear. 
The sample of oil and salt firms surveyed reported very high 
13 In bootstrapping, statistical inference relies on randomly sampling, with 
replacement, from an original dataset. It can help examine robustness with 
small sample sizes (Steyerberg et al., 2001). 
14 All other things being equal - capturing the effect one economic variable has 
on another, provided all other variables remain the same. 
A. Saha et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Food Policy 104 (2021) 102143
8
compliance, using both formal and reported measures. Regarding formal 
compliance, oil firms were asked: ‘Have you signed the MoU with the 
Ministry of Industry?’ 74% of oil firms reported formal compliance. Re-
ported compliance was queried directly, asking ‘Are you using any 
Vitamin A in your product?’, and interestingly, the same oil sample re-
ported 91% compliance. Salt firms were asked about formal and re-
ported compliance, in response to the following questions, respectively: 
‘Have you submitted a report to BSCIC regarding fortification status in the 
last year?’, and ‘Are you using any iodine in your product?’ salt firms re-
ported 97% and 90% formal and reported compliance respectively. 
These high levels of formal and reported compliance are consistent 
with firm’s reluctance in reporting during the pilot study, and are 
therefore unlikely to help study the factors explaining compliance 
among firms, given their low variability. And while every effort was 
made to collect information on actual compliance at the firm-level, it 
proved impossible to gather product samples within the scope of this 
study. In fact, during our pilot survey, we discovered that there are 
numerous gaps in collecting and testing samples in-country. To over-
come these limitations, we designed a survey that focused on the process 
of fortification. 
We rely on our CBS 1 score to gain a better understanding of 
compliance behaviour among firms. Table 3 reports the average CBS 1 
score for oil and salt firms. Salt firms on average score 0.618 on 
compliance, and oil firms score higher than salt firms and are at an 
average of 0.753.15 The difference in the mean value of CBS 1 between 
the two samples of firms is statistically significant (t = − 2.6049, p =
0.0102). 
The distribution of CBS 1 for oil and salt producers (Fig. A3in Ap-
pendix B) reveals that the probability of achieving a better compliance 
score is higher for oil firms, while this is much more varied for salt firms 
as we note a bimodal distribution. When we examine the distribution of 
CBS 1 by districts (Fig. A4in Appendix B) we also note some differences. 
For instance, looking at the sample of salt firms we see that those that are 
based in the district of Narayangonj have a median score that is more 
than 0.5 points lower than the others. 
Next, we compared the key variables from the quantitative survey 
with the qualitative data that generally affirmed the descriptive results. 
We discuss two real-life examples here. First, looking at oil firms, a good 
example emerges from one oil refinery with its main factory in Nar-
ayangonj that stressed the extremely high price of premix as the main 
challenge for fortification, in addition to reporting no specific business 
benefits coming from fortification and that the procedure was carried 
out only to comply with regulations. In addition, we found that the 
respondent lacked knowledge of the fortification process and only 
mentioned temporary bans as the main risk of not fortifying food. 
Comparing with our survey data, we find this reflected in our CBS 1 
score for the firm (0.385, within the 1st quartile of the score) and its 
“engagement” (2, within the 1st quartile of the variable). 
Second, when we look at salt firms, one firm, also based in Nar-
ayangonj, claim that they started fortifying the product even before it 
became mandatory. The firm asserted that the procedure does not 
significantly increase the cost of production and that non-complying 
firms should be punished as fortification is a “must” for businesses 
operating in this industry. Moreover, the respondent appeared to be 
quite knowledgeable about the fortification process, and the firm had 
proper chemists and a lab to control the whole procedure. In this case, 
the main risk of not fortifying was highlighted as the loss of the firm’s 
good reputation. Again, these qualitative insights are reflected in our 
quantitative measures: the values of CBS 1 and “engagement” are the 
highest among the sample of salt firms (0.994 and 4, respectively). 
Further, to assess how the main variables of interest are systemati-
cally related to fortification standards, we analyse the differences be-
tween complying and non-complying firms, as defined by the dummy 
variableComply. Table 4 outlines key descriptive statistics for the sample 
of oil firms (Panel A) and salt firms (Panel B) reporting the mean values 
and standard deviations (in brackets) of the variables in the baseline 
estimations to follow. T-tests for the differences in the means between 
the complying and non-complying group are also reported. For the 
sample of oil firms, we observe a significant difference in the engage-
ment score between complying and non-complying firms (p < 0.01), and 
in the perceived effectiveness of the penalties and incentives set by the 
government (at the 5% level). There is also a significant difference (at 
the 5% level) in food fortification engagement between the two sub-
samples for salt firms. 
Table 3 
Compliance score for oil and salt firms.  
CBS1 Mean Standard deviation Min. Max. 
OIL (35)  0.753  0.276  0.141  0.997 
SALT (102)  0.618  0.261  0.000  0.994  
Table 4 
Differences between complying and non-complying firms.  
Panel A: Oil sample  
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Observations 102 23 79  
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. P-values are reported in 
square brackets. We select the appropriate t-test by first testing for equality of 
variances between the two groups using a (Icddr’b, 2015) robust statistic (Brown 
and Forsythe, 1974) *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
15 We examine the correlation between our process measure and product 
outcomes at an aggregate level. We compared the proportion of firms that are 
identified as complying based on our scores with a proxy for the level of 
fortification in Bangladesh. First, with respect to oil, the percentage of both 
bulk and packaged oil that is fortified (either below or above the standard) is 
59% (GAIN and icddr’b, 2017). Second, for salt, a more telling statistic is given 
by the proportion of households that consume fortified product compared to the 
total population with access to salt, which is 69% (Icddr’b, 2015). Now, ac-
cording to our scores, the proportion of firms that adequately fortify food in our 
sample is 66% for oil and 77% for salt respectively. These values are highly 
correlated with the aforementioned proxies. Further, our scores are also much 
more accurate than firms’ reported level of compliance in the survey (91% for 
oil and 90% for salt respectively) that demonstrates that the inaccuracies in the 
above relationship are compensated for by ease of implementation of our 
methodology. 
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5.2. Oil firms 
Table 5 reports the baseline results for the oil sample using logit 
estimation, where we estimate equation [1] by sequentially adding the 
primary variables of interest [Models I–V]. Column (I) includes 
Engagementand all control variables; columns (II) and (III) introduce 
Inspections and Effectiveness in turn; column (IV) replaces the raw num-
ber of inspections for an inspection dummy that captures higher fre-
quency of inspections on average; and column (V) examines the 
robustness of the baseline by bootstrapping using five replications of the 
sample to validate the model building process (rather than estimates). 
We find a positive and significant relationship between Engagement 
and compliance across all five models in Table 5, suggesting that greater 
engagement with food fortification including knowledge around the 
issues surrounding fortification and its regulation, as well as the health 
implications and current consumption levels of fortified food, is asso-
ciated with greater firms’ compliance, providing strong evidence in 
favour of H1. Using Model IV, the coefficient for Engagement implies 
that, ceteris paribus, an increase of one point in the score on average is 
predicted to increase the probability of complying by 31.4 percentage 
points.16 
We find no evidence for H2, there being no significant correlation 
between compliance and the frequency of inspections for oil firms in 
Models II–III in Table 5. To examine the implications of the results for 
H2 closely, we consider the possibility that inspections by regulatory 
authorities are effective only when they are more frequent than usual. 
So, in Model IV, we introduce a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the 
number of regulatory audits is higher than the average, and 0 otherwise, 
to compare firms that are inspected the most with those that are 
inspected less frequently. We note a positive (H2) but still weak 
correlation with compliance. In Models III and IV, Effectiveness has the 
expected positive sign (in line with H3), but its effect is not statistically 
different from 0. 
The non-significant effect of Inspections and Effectiveness may owe to 
the more recent introduction of fortification regulation for edible oil in 
2013 (Aaron et al., 2017), such that firms are yet to be accustomed to all 
the necessary requirements for effective compliance for inspections to 
have any clear effects. The positive correlation for the group inspected 
with a greater frequency also suggests the same. 
Further, our qualitative data point to some inconsistencies in regu-
latory enforcement in the oil sector. More specifically, large-scale oil 
firms, who produce traceable bottled oil and untraceable bulk oil 
products, are regulated through compliance inspections at the retail and 
wholesale level. In other words, they do not receive regulators at firm- 
gate but regulators can trace the origin of bottled oil to specific firms 
and enforce the fortification status through this channel. In contrast, 
small- and medium-scale firms are inspected for compliance at the firm- 
gate. Inspections likely capture both of these two mechanisms. However, 
the former – i.e. traceability-based mechanism – incentivises firms to 
fortify bottled – i.e. traceable – oil products but not bulk. Therefore, the 
non-significant effect of Inspections may also be attributed to the fact that 
compliance inspections do not affect bulk oil products, which are often 
inadequately fortified (GAIN and icddr’b, 2017). Additionally, in-
spections may be for reasons beyond compliance and include inspection 
of equipment as opposed to actually taking a sample and testing it for 
Vitamin A. 
5.3. Salt firms 
Table 6 reports the results for the salt sample using logit estimation, 
presenting models by sequentially adding the primary variables of in-
terest [Models I–V]. The first four columns reproduce the specifications 
used for the sample of oil firms. Column (I) includes Engagement with all 
control variables; columns (II) and (III) introduce Inspections and 
Effectiveness in turn; and column (IV) replaces the number of inspections 
with the inspection dummy that captures higher frequency of in-
spections on average. 
Again, we find a positive and significant relationship between food 
fortification engagement and compliance across all five models in 6, 
suggesting that, ceteris paribus, greater engagement with issues sur-
rounding fortification and its regulation, as well as the health implica-
tions and current consumption levels of fortified food, is associated with 
greater firms’ compliance, providing strong evidence in favour of H1. 
The effect of food fortification engagement is also quite sizeable: on 
average, and ceteris paribus, an increase of one point is predicted to in-
crease the probability of complying by 13.7 percentage points. 
For the salt estimation, ceteris paribus, we find that the coefficient for 
Inspections is negative and significant in 6, and the magnitude of the 
effect increases between Models II and III. The negative effect is again 
opposed to the expected hypothesised effect in H2 (i.e., that compliance 
is likely to increase with more frequent inspections). In Model IV, we 
substitute the number of inspections with the dummy that captures in-
spections that are more frequent than the average, similarly to the 
sample of oil firms. However, interestingly, the effect stays negative and 
significant, in opposition to H2. Using Model IV as the baseline, the 
coefficient for inspection dummy implies that ceteris paribus, on average, 
being subject to a higher number of inspections reduces the probability 
of complying by 24.3 percentage points. These results seem to hint that 
firms that are more likely to be violators are inspected more often, as 
also suggested by Gupta et al. (2019). Indeed, our qualitative data shows 
that BSCIC, the regulatory body responsible for inspecting salt mills in 
Bangladesh, works closely with small- and medium-scale mills that tend 
to lack adequate facilities to conduct and monitor fortification. As a 
result, they inspect large-scale mills, i.e. compliant firms, less often than 
small- and medium-scale mills. In Models III and IV, in 6, the perceived 
effectiveness of incentives and penalties has the positive predicted sign 
Table 5 
Explaining compliance – oil firms.  
Dependent variable: Dummy Comply 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Model I Model II Model 
III 
Model IV Model V  
Baseline Inspections, Incentives & Penalties Bootstrapping 
Engagement 1.571*** 1.533*** 1.221* 1.594** 1.571***  
(0.504) (0.515) (0.654) (0.748) (0.534) 
Inspections      
Inspections  − 0.095 
(0.305) 
− 0.081 
(0.299)   
Insp dummy    2.040 
(1.676)  
Incentives and 
penalties      
Effectiveness   0.482 0.717     
(0.824) (0.587)  
Controls      
Employees 0.001 0.001 0.001 − 0.001 0.001  
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.019) 
Age 0.050 0.073 0.102 0.069 0.050  
(0.108) (0.084) (0.129) (0.156) (0.118) 
AvgInst 0.258 0.203 0.203 0.376 0.258  
(0.452) (0.400) (0.385) (0.514) (0.784) 
Constant − 4.558** − 4.286** − 5.251 − 7.632** − 4.558  
(1.907) (1.995) (3.244) (3.400) (3.030) 
Observations 35 35 35 35 35 
Pseudo R- 
Square 
0.287 0.290 0.313 0.359 0.287 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
16 The relatively small sample (35 observations) may lead to a lack of preci-
sion of the estimates. However, we conducted a Wald test for the joint signif-
icance of the three primary variables in Model IV and we find these are 
statistically significant at the 5% level (p=0.025), and thus should be included 
in the specification. 
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(H3), but it is again not statistically significant.17 
We examine an additional hypothesis for incentives and penalties 
(H4) in the context of the salt industry in Bangladesh – the mediating 
effect of food fortification engagement on a firm’s distrust of incentives 
and penalties. Thus, engagement would diminish the adverse effects of a 
perceived ineffectiveness of enforcement measures. In Model V, we 
replace Effectiveness with a dummy variable Distrust that takes the value 
1 for firms where average perceived effectiveness of the incentives and 
penalties set by the government is less than the 4.5.18 The negative sign 
on Distrust hints that weak regulatory enforcement has a detrimental 
effect on firm’s behaviour, as suggested by Luthringer et al. (2015). This 
is also in line with the insights from the qualitative data. Firstly, the fine 
that would be imposed if firms are found non-compliant by BSCIC is low 
(i.e. 50,000BDT or approximately 590 USD), providing limited in-
centives for firms to comply. Since the fortification law was introduced 
in 1989, the legal fee has not been updated. Secondly, BSCIC provides 
iodine premix to salt firms in Bangladesh and salt mills associations and 
one mill indicated that the delivery of iodine premix is often inadequate 
and/or late. This may lead to a situation where BSCIC is unwilling to 
punish mills for its own shortcomings in supplying premix at an 
adequate quantity within a given time frame. 
To examine the effect of food fortification engagement in moderating 
this distrust, we include the interaction term Distrust × Engagement. We 
observe an expected positive and statistically significant effect for the 
interaction, which counterbalances the negative effect of the dummy 
Distrust, affirming the role of food fortification engagement in mediating 
the effect of distrust on compliance. Fig. 3 below plots the predicted 
likelihood of compliance for salt firms – by distrust (1) and trust (0) – 
that further depicts the mediating role of Engagement. Even for firms that 
generally distrust incentives and penalties (distrust (1)), a greater 
engagement is linked with an increase in compliance. 
5.4. Robustness 
To assess the reliability of our findings we perform a series of 
Table 6 
Explaining compliance – salt firms.  
Dependent Variable: Dummy Comply 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V  
Baseline Inspections, Incentives & Penalties Interaction 
Engagement 0.743* 0.963** 0.932** 0.997** 0.166  
(0.383) (0.418) (0.417) (0.435) (0.637) 
Inspections      
Inspections  ¡0.044* ¡0.056**  − 0.030   
(0.023) (0.027)  (0.024) 
Insp dummy    ¡1.537**      
(0.715)  
Incentives and penalties      
Effectiveness   0.175 0.204     
(0.199) (0.200)  
Distrust     ¡3.106*      
(1.648) 
Interaction      
Distrust*Engagement     1.991**      
(0.915) 
Controls      
Employees 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.016 0.019  
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
Age 0.028* 0.032* 0.032** 0.030** 0.025  
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
AvgInst 0.261 0.243 0.212 0.149 0.147  
(0.198) (0.194) (0.204) (0.224) (0.238) 
Constant − 2.497* − 1.986 − 2.229 − 2.530 − 0.434  
(1.329) (1.481) (1.556) (1.575) (1.954) 
Observations 102 102 102 102 102 
Pseudo R-Square 0.109 0.140 0.147 0.160 0.190 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Fig. 3. Predicted compliance for salt firms, by distrust (1) and trust (0). Note: 
Graph plots predicted compliance and confidence intervals by Distrust dummy. 
Predicted compliance on Y-axis. Engagement on X-axis. The difference in pre-
dictive margins of compliance, and its changing pattern with increasing 
engagement, affirms the role played by food fortification engagement. 
17 The absence of a statistically significant effect might be partially due to the 
relative low value of the penalty set out in the current law for salt mills that do 
not meet fortification requirements (Bangladeshi Taka (BDT) 50,000 or 
approximately 590 USD). 
18 Set at below the third quintile of the variable – splits the sample between 
those that have full trust in the institutional regime (45 observations) and those 
that perceive the incentives and penalties already in place as not entirely 
effective (57 observations). 
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robustness checks. First, we replicate our results employing the discrete 
CBS 1 itself instead of the dummy Comply.19 We then re-estimate the 
baseline specifications using the alternative definition of the score (CBS 
2). The results from these two robustness checks are in Appendices D and 
E. 
We also compute an alternate Compliance Index (CI) using principal 
components analysis (PCA). The estimates obtained when the dependent 
variable is the compliance dummy based on the index computed through 
the PCA is reported in Appendix F. 
Results for the oil sample are unaffected by the changes in the var-
iable underlying the dummy.20 When we look at the salt sample, the 
negative effect of Inspectionspersists and the magnitude of the co-
efficients for Engagement is slightly smaller across the models. However, 
the main insights that we get are the same as those from the baseline 
estimations. 
Overall, the above analysis together with the ones reported in the 
Appendix suggest that our previous results are robust and unaffected. 
The results for Engagement appear to be the most robust and consistent 
across the different checks. In addition, the mediating effect of food 
fortification engagement we captured in our baseline estimations is 
quite robust as well. 
5.5. Validation 
We examine the predictive power of our compliance score relative to 
government standards on micronutrient content for food fortification in 
Bangladesh.21 Using reported total yearly production and the type and 
amount of fortificant used by the oil and salt firms, we obtain an esti-
mate of the average concentration (in part per million or ppm) of 
micronutrient in the final product. Next, we create a dummy variable 
‘WithinStd’ that takes the value of 1 if the estimate of the micronutrient 
concentration falls within the government’s standard and 0 otherwise.22 
Finally, we run logit models (Appendix G) using WithinStd as dependent 
variable, and our CBS1 score as the main covariate with the control 
variables. We find a positive and statistically significant coefficient for 
CBS1 both for oil and salt firms, which implies that an increase in our 
compliance score is correlated with the firms reporting more accurate 
fortification. 
6. Discussion and policy implications 
Regulatory monitoring is conducted by national inspectorate 
agencies at the levels of production sites borders, customs warehouses or 
retail stores to confirm that food is fortified at levels that comply with 
relevant legislation and standards. At firm production sites, such an 
inspection visit comprises two broad categories of activities. First, an 
audit that includes verification, inspection, and audits of quality assur-
ance and quality control (QA/QC) processes and fortification inputs 
such as micronutrient premix. This component involves the inspector 
completing an audit checklist to ascertain quality management: confir-
mation that processes, systems and equipment are in place that ensure 
the production of a quality product. Second, product sampling and 
testing of composite samples for nutrient content. 
Tackling this challenge of measuring conformity to micronutrient 
specifications in nationally adopted food fortification standards head on, 
the unique CBS score provides an alternative to the more prohibitive 
quantitative tests that often result in weaknesses in regulatory moni-
toring. Our methodology can be incorporated into current practice by 
building on the existing audit checklist and adding a theory-based 
metric of compliance behaviour, the CBS score. In fact, this method is 
significantly cheaper to implement in comparison of the costs of lab 
testing, providing cost savings of 30%-40% relative to product sampling 
and analysis for nutrient content. 
We find that greater engagement with regulations is significantly 
linked to firms’ compliance with food fortification. This refers to the 
likely benefits from improving firm’s knowledge around the issues sur-
rounding fortification and its regulation, as well as the health implica-
tions and current consumption levels of fortified food – as in the case of 
oil and salt in Bangladesh. This finding is similar to UK’s HSE commis-
sioned research23 which identifies that a need for education and 
awareness remains when promoting compliance to regulations. Our 
study finds that returns from investing in improving engagement of oil 
and salt firms in Bangladesh is also quite sizable. 
In fact, engagement with fortification can also diminish the negative 
effect of a general distrust of government effectiveness in deterring non- 
compliance. For example, salt firms in Bangladesh only incur a very low 
fine for non-compliance that has not been updated since its introduction 
in 1989. In such a scenario, implementation of programmes targeted at 
increasing food fortification engagement can be a useful instrument to 
improve firms’ likelihood of compliance, especially in the salt industry. 
This would not just facilitate the implementation of food fortification, 
but would also help mitigate the adverse impact of distrust in incentives 
and penalties for salt firms operating in a complex economic setting such 
as Bangladesh. 
Looking to institutional factors, there appear to be some in-
consistencies in regulatory enforcement, as seen in the oil sector. While 
large-scale oil firms that produce a combination of traceable bottled oil 
and untraceable bulk oil products in Bangladesh are regulated through 
compliance inspections at the retail and wholesale level, small- and 
medium-scale firms are inspected for compliance at the firm-gate. The 
former may be incentivising firms to fortify bottled oil products but the 
same may not be true for bulk oil. 
Further, we find that inspections may work for some firms (for oil 
firms in Bangladesh) only when they occur with greater frequency i.e., 
they occur more often in a given year. This finding may be partly due to 
the recent introduction of the regulation for oil firms in Bangladesh, 
which could demand persistent regulatory audits to ensure that firms get 
accustomed to all the necessary requirements for effective compliance. 
But it also affirms the positive correlation between inspections and 
compliance as in Hawkins (2010). Overall, this result suggests that in an 
institutional environment that has experienced changes, government 
inspections could reduce the perceived cost of compliance by, for 
instance, helping firms to assess the quality of the new fortification 
equipment. The result also suggests that there are indirect benefits from 
inspections – especially towards improvements in quality of final 
product, once equipment and processes are assessed. 
However, for other firms (salt firms in Bangladesh), we find that 
being subject to greater inspections is associated with lower compliance. 
A likely explanation for this is that in the given institutional environ-
ment, the greater frequency of government inspections might be sys-
tematically related to poorer performance– suggesting that more regular 
audits tend to target those firms that are more likely not to comply with 
fortification regulations. In fact, our qualitative data suggests that 
BSCIC, the regulatory body responsible for inspecting salt mills in 
Bangladesh, inspects large-scale mills that also tend to be more 
compliant firms, less often than small- and medium-scale mills. It may 
19 As the dependent variable now is a fractional one, we estimate our models 
using GLM with the binomial as the distributional family and a logit as the link 
function, as suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (1996).  
20 The dummyComply based on the CBS 1 and the one based on the CI are 
equivalent.  
21 Standard for salt: 20–50 ppm (See for details: https://fortificationdata.or 
g/). Standard for oil: 15–30 Retinol equivalents (RE) ppm (Jungjohann et al., 
2021).  
22 Note that this proxy is meant to capture not just the level of micronutrient 
used, but if the firm is correctly fortifying or not and it does not rely on in-
formation used to build our compliance score. 23 Health and Safety Executive, UK. Wright, M., S., (1998). 
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also be the case that for salt firms operating within a more mature and 
consolidated institutional framework, frequent inspections are 
perceived only as an additional burden by complying firms, such that we 
find greater inspections are linked with lower compliance. 
Finally, there are two directions of future research that emerge from 
our study. First, full external validity of the methodology and score 
against product testing at a disaggregated level. Second, we aim for our 
compliance measure to feed into a sustainable longer-term compliance 
method combining frequent monitoring using the compliance behaviour 
score with occasional quantitative product testing. 
7. Conclusion 
The compliance score produced in this study presents a unique 
framework for measuring/predicting compliance and identifying sig-
nificant factors explaining compliance that can be used to inform 
modifications in fortification programmes and policy. This tool captures 
compliance based on different stages of a standard compliance process 
following a firm’s decision to comply (Henson and Heasman, 1998). We 
apply the methodology for fortification standards for oil and salt pro-
ducers in Bangladesh. In doing so, this study presents, to the best of our 
knowledge, the first systematic empirical evidence on the topic. 
First, we find that engagement is significantly linked with compli-
ance, pointing towards prioritizing greater investments in education and 
awareness when promoting compliance to regulations. Second, we find 
that greater frequency of face-to-face interactions can improve compli-
ance in the case of recent introduction of the regulation. Third, firms’ 
distrust in the effectiveness of incentives and penalties can hamper 
compliance, but when firm are more aware and engaged, they have a 
better understanding of the policy that helps recognize the value of 
complying for their brand. 
In summary, compliance and enforcement strategies that combine 
increasing engagement with a prudent inspections policy that accounts 
for different institutional settings are more likely to enhance compliance 
behaviour for oil and salt firms in Bangladesh. Prioritising future pro-
grammes that enable such mechanisms should be priority for govern-
ments and other stakeholders working to improve compliance to food 
fortification standards. 
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Appendix A. Compliance score details 
See Table A1. 
Table A1 
Components underlying compliance score, by type of firm.  
Oil firms Salt firms Description 
Storage facility for premix Storage facility for premix Facility to store premix obtained by firm – these can be inventories or simple storage in warehouse. 
Premix measurement equipment Premix measurement equipment Apparatus to accurately measure premix – salt or oil premix needs differ for equipment to facilitate 
measurement of iodine/Vitamin A. 
Mixers Mixers Mixers can be of different types depending on scale, for example, small, electric, rotating-drum, etc. 
Fortification related IT use Fortification related IT use Any information technology needs to fortify or better inform the process of fortification. 
Testing samples (lab facilities)   
a. Single ‘grab sample’  
b. Composite sample 
Testing samples (lab facilities)   
a. Single ‘grab sample’  
b. Composite sample 
Laboratory facilities to test samples of oil or salt for adequate fortification and retention. 
Recording (of premix, mixing, 
final products, etc.)   
a. Premix stocktake  
b. Premix calculations  
c. Equipment maintenance  
d. Equipment calibration  
e. Mixing procedure  
f. Frequency of sampling  
g. Point of sampling  
h. Test methods validation  
i. Corrective actions 
Recording (of premix, mixing, 
final products, etc.)   
a. Premix stocktake  
b. Premix calculations  
c. Equipment maintenance  
d. Equipment calibration  
e. Mixing procedure  
f. Frequency of sampling  
g. Point of sampling  
h. Test methods validation  
i. Corrective actions 
Records on stock-taking should reflect the verification of the quantities and condition of premix held in 
inventory or warehouse. Records on premix calculations refers to the addition formulae used. Records 
on equipment maintenance should reflect the routine checks on the fortification equipment. Records 
on equipment calibration refers to setting the appropriate rate of delivery of the micronutrient within 
the defined range. Records on the mixing procedure should show that the premix delivery system has 
been validated. Records on the frequency of sampling should reflect that the frequency is appropriate 
for the final quantity of product produced. Records on the point of sampling should show that samples 
or sub-samples are taken from predetermined point or points in the production process. Records on test 
methods validation should ensure that the testing process is suitable for its intended use. Records on 
corrective actions should show the interventions taken if verification procedures confirm a product is 
potentially out-of-specification. 
Titration equipment  Titration equipment specific to oil firms to determine the concentration of a substance in a solution. 
Blenders  Blenders needed for oil firms to mix Vitamin A.  
Spraying technology Spraying is an important part of salt fortification as it involves spraying a solution that contains iodine.  
Salt Iodization Plant Salt iodization plants facilitate the procedure of fortification.  
Salt test kits Kits to test salt for requisite levels of iodine.  
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Appendix B. Additional descriptives 
See Figs. A1–A4. 
Fig. A1. Geographical distribution of firms in study sample.  
Fig. A2. Intermediate scores underlying compliance score. Note: The bars report the mean and error bars report standard deviations.  
Fig. A3. Distribution of CBS 1, by type of firm. NOTE: Kernel density visualises the distribution of data over the score. Red line shows the mean score. (For 
interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
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Appendix C. Principal component analysis 
See Table A2. 
Appendix D. Robustness Checks: CBS 1 – Discrete 
See Table A3 and A4. 
Fig. A4. Box-and-whisker plots for CBS 1 by districts.  
Table A2 
First eigenvector and proportion of variance that explains, by type of firm.  
Principal Component Analysis  
Oil Sample Salt Sample 
Proportion of Variance Explained 96% 72% 
Loadings 
Use 0.505 0.580 
Source 0.505 0.273 
Access 0.505 0.580 
Quality 0.484 0.502  
Table A3 
CBS1 - Oil firms.  
Dependent Variable: CBS 1-discrete  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV  









Inspections     
Inspections  − 0.137 
(0.163) 
− 0.118 
(0.149)  Insp dummy  1.061 
(0.713) 
Incentives and penalties     
Effectiveness   0.266 
(0.310) 
0.434* 
(0.248)    

































Observations 35 35 35 35 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Appendix E. Robustness Checks: CBS 2 
See Table A5 and A6. 
Table A5 
CBS2 - Oil firms.  
Dependent variable: Dummy Comply based on CBS 2 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Model I Model II Model III Model IV  









Inspections     
Inspections  − 0.095 
(0.305) 
− 0.081 
(0.299)     
Insp dummy    2.040 
(1.676)     
Incentives and penalties     
Effectiveness   0.482 
(0.824) 
0.717 
(0.587)    

































Observations 35 35 35 35 
Pseudo R-Square 0.287 0.290 0.313 0.359 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Table A6 
CBS2 - Salt firms.  
Dependent variable: Dummy Comply based on CBS 2 









Model (V)  











Inspections      





(0.022)    
Insp dummy    − 0.798 
(0.577)       
Incentives and 
penalties      
Effectiveness   0.089 
(0.171) 
0.104 
(0.172)      
Distrust     ¡2.540* 
(1.455)      
Interaction      
Distrust*Engagement     1.518** 
(0.730)      


















(0.015)  (0.015) 




















Observations 102 102 102 102 102 
Pseudo R-Square 0.0864 0.0954 0.0976 0.101 0.131 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Table A4 
CBS1 - Salt firms.  
Dependent Variable: CBS 1-discrete 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V  











Inspections      





(0.012)    
Insp dummy    ¡0.496* 
(0.259)       
Incentives and penalties      
Effectiveness   0.058 
(0.079) 
0.051 
(0.080)      
Distrust     ¡1.480** 
(0.684) 
Interaction      
Distrust*Engagement     0.818** 
(0.333) 









































Observations 102 102 102 102 102 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Appendix F. Robustness Checks: Compliance Index 
See Tables A7 and A8. 
Table A7 
Compliance Index – Oil firms.  
Dependent variable: Dummy Comply based on CI 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Model I Model II Model III Model IV  
Baseline Inspections, Incentives & Penalties   
Engagement 1.571*** 1.533*** 1.221* 1.594**  
(0.504) (0.515) (0.654) (0.748) 
Inspections     
Inspections  − 0.095 (0.305) − 0.081 (0.299)  
Insp dummy    2.040 (1.676) 
Incentives and penalties     
Effectiveness   0.482 0.717    
(0.824) (0.587) 
Controls     
Employees 0.001 0.001 0.001 − 0.001  
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age 0.050 0.073 0.102 0.069  
(0.108) (0.084) (0.129) (0.156) 
AvgInst 0.258 0.203 0.203 0.376  
(0.452) (0.400) (0.385) (0.514) 
Constant − 4.558** − 4.286** − 5.251 − 7.632**  
(1.907) (1.995) (3.244) (3.400) 
Observations 35 35 35 35 
Pseudo R-Square 0.287 0.290 0.313 0.359 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Table A8 
Compliance Index – Salt firms.  
Dependent Variable: Dummy Comply based on CI 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V  
Baseline Inspections, Incentives & Penalties Interaction 
Engagement 0.548 0.848** 0.801** 0.864** − 0.219  
(0.362) (0.406) (0.397) (0.412) (0.610) 
Inspections      
Inspections  ¡0.061** ¡0.076**  ¡0.046*   
(0.025) (0.030)  (0.026) 
Insp dummy    ¡1.954**      
(0.772)  
Incentives and penalties      
Effectiveness   0.228 0.248     
(0.211) (0.219)  
Distrust     ¡4.571***      
(1.702) 
Interaction      
Distrust*Engagement     2.833***      
(0.987) 
Controls      
Employees 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.010 0.014  
(0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) 
Age 0.030** 0.036** 0.037** 0.033** 0.027  
(0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) 
AvgInst 0.321* 0.309* 0.280 0.193 0.193  
(0.189) (0.187) (0.196) (0.224) (0.237) 
Constant − 2.124* − 1.406 − 1.744 − 2.099 0.863  
(1.231) (1.425) (1.486) (1.472) (2.086) 
Observations 102 102 102 102 102 
Pseudo R-Square 0.093 0.153 0.165 0.174 0.241 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Appendix G. Validation 
See Table A9. 
Appendix H. Supplementary material 
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi. 
org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2021.102143. 
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